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Abstract
We investigate how robust are results of committee elections to small changes in the input
preference orders, depending on the voting rules used. We find that for typical rules the effect of
making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single preference order is either that (1) at most
one committee member can be replaced, or (2) it is possible that the whole committee can be
replaced. We also show that the problem of computing the smallest number of swaps that lead
to changing the election outcome is typically NP-hard, but there are natural FPT algorithms.
Finally, for a number of rules we assess experimentally the average number of random swaps
necessary to change the election result.
1 Introduction
We study how multiwinner voting rules (i.e., procedures used to select fixed-size committees of
candidates) react to (small) changes in the input votes. We are interested both in the complexity
of computing the smallest modification of the votes that affects the election outcome, and in the
extent of the possible changes. We start by discussing our ideas informally in the following example.
Consider a research-funding agency that needs to choose which of the submitted project pro-
posals to support. The agency asks a group of experts to evaluate the proposals and to rank them
from the best to the worst one. Then, the agency uses some formal process—here modeled as a
multiwinner voting rule—to aggregate these rankings and to select k projects to be funded. Let
us imagine that one of the experts realized that instead of ranking some proposal A as better
than B, he or she should have given the opposite opinion. What are the consequences of such a
“mistake” of the expert? It may not affect the results at all, or it may cause only a minor change:
Perhaps proposal A would be dropped (to the benefit of B or some other proposal) or B would be
selected (at the expense of A or some other proposal). We show that while this indeed would be
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the case under a number of multiwinner voting rules (e.g., under the k-Borda rule; see Section 2 for
definitions), there exist other rules (e.g., STV or the Chamberlin–Courant rule) for which such a
single swap could lead to selecting a completely disjoint set of proposals. The agency would prefer
to avoid situations where small changes in the experts’ opinions lead to (possibly large) changes in
the outcomes; so the agency would want to be able to compute the smallest number of swaps that
would change the result. In cases where this number is too small, the agency might invite more
experts to gain confidence in the results.
More formally, a multiwinner voting rule is a function that, given a set of rankings of the
candidates and an integer k, outputs a family of size-k subsets of the candidates (the winning
committees). We consider the following three issues (for simplicity, below we assume to always
have a unique winning committee):
1. We say that a multiwinner rule R is `-robust if (1) swapping two adjacent candidates in a
single vote can lead to replacing no more than ` candidates in the winning committee1, and
(2) there are examples where exactly ` candidates are indeed replaced; we refer to ` as the
robustness level of R. Notably, the robustness level is between 1 and k, with 1-robust being
the strongest form of robustness one could ask for. We ask for the robustness levels of several
multiwinner rules.
2. We say that the robustness radius of an election E (for committee size k) under a multiwinner
rule R is the smallest number of swaps (of adjacent candidates) which are necessary to change
the election outcome. We ask for the complexity of computing the robustness radius (referred
to as the Robustness Radius problem) under a number of multiwinner rules (this problem is
strongly related to the Margin of Victory [19, 6, 25, 4] and Destructive Swap Bribery
problems [12, 24]; in particular, it follows up on the study of robustness of single-winner rules
of Shiryaev et al. [24])
3. We ask how many random swaps of adjacent candidates are necessary, on average, to move
from a randomly generated election to one with a different outcome. Doing experiments, we
assess the practical robustness of our rules.
There is quite a number of multiwinner rules. We consider only several of them, selected to
represent a varied set of ideas from the literature (ranging from variants of scoring rules, through
rules inspired by the Condorcet criterion, to the elimination-based STV rule). We find that all
these rules are either 1-robust (so a single swap can replace at most one committee member) or are
k-robust (so a single swap can replace the whole committee of size k).2 Somewhat surprisingly, this
phenomenon is deeply connected to the complexity of winner determination. Specifically, we show
(under mild assumptions) that if a rule has a constant robustness level, then it has a polynomial-
time computable refinement (that is, it is possible to compute one of its outcomes in polynomial
time). Since for many rules the problem of computing such a refinement is NP-hard, we get a quick
way of finding out that such rules have non-constant robustness levels.
The Robustness Radius problem tends to be NP-hard (sometimes even for a single swap)
and, thus, we seek fixed-parameter tractability (FPT) results. For example, we find several FPT
algorithms parametrized by the number of voters (useful, e.g., for scenarios with few experts, such
as our introductory example). See Table 1 for an overview on our theoretical results.
1Indeed, the formal definition is more complex due to taking care of ties.
2We also construct somewhat artificial rules with robustness levels between 1 and k.
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Voting Rule Robustness Level Complexity of Robustness Radius
SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda (P) 1 P
k-Copeland (P) 1 NP-hard, FPT(m)
NED (NP-hard [1]) k NP-hard, FPT(m)
STV (NP-hard3 [9]) k NP-hard(B), FPT(m), FPT(n)
β-CC (NP-hard [22, 18, 3]) k NP-hard(B), FPT(m), FPT(n)
Table 1: Summary of our results. Together with each rule, we provide the complexity of its winner
determination. The parameters m, n, and B mean, respectively, the number of candidates, the
number of voters, and the robustness radius; NP-hard(B) means NP-hard even for constant B.
We complement our work with an experimental evaluation of how robust are our rules with
respect to random swaps. On the average, to change the outcome of an election, one needs to make
the most swaps under the k-Borda rule.
2 Preliminaries
Elections. An election E = (C, V ) consists of a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and of a
collection of voters V = (v1, . . . , vn). We consider the ordinal election model, where each voter v is
associated with a preference order v, that is, with a ranking of the candidates from the most to
the least desirable one (according to this voter). A multiwinner voting rule R is a function that,
given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee size k, outputs a set R(E, k) of size-k subsets of C,
referred to as the winning committees (each of these committees ties for victory).
(Committee) Scoring Rules. Given a voter v and a candidate c, by posv(c) we denote the
position of c in v’s preference order (the top-ranked candidate has position 1 and the following
candidate has position 2, and so on). A scoring function for m candidates is a function γm : [m]→ R
that associates each candidate-position with a score. Examples of scoring functions include (1) the
Borda scoring functions, βm(i) = m− i; and (2) the t-Approval scoring functions, αt(i) defined so
that αt(i) = 1 if i ≤ t and αt(i) = 0 otherwise (α1 is typically referred to as the Plurality scoring
function). For a scoring function γm, the γm-score of a candidate c in an m-candidate election
E = (C, V ) is defined as γm-scoreE(c) =
∑
v∈V γm(posv(c)).
For a given election E and a committee size k, the SNTV score of a size-k committee S is defined
as the sum of the Plurality scores of its members. The SNTV rule outputs the committee(s) with the
highest score (i.e., the rule outputs the committees that consist of k candidates with the highest
plurality scores; there may be more than one such committee due to ties). Bloc and k-Borda
rules are defined analogously, but using k-Approval and Borda scoring functions, respectively. The
Chamberlin–Courant rule [7] (abbreviated as β-CC) also outputs the committees with the highest
score, but computes these scores in a somewhat different way: The score of committee S in a vote
v is the Borda score of the highest-ranked member of S (the score of a committee is the sum of the
scores from all voters).
SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and β-CC are examples of committee scoring rules [11, 13]. However,
3For STV there is a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a single winning committee, but deciding if a given
committee wins is NP-hard.
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while the first three rules are polynomial-time computable, winner determination for β-CC is well-
known to be NP-hard [22, 18, 3].
Condorcet-Inspired Rules. A candidate c is a Condorcet winner (resp. a weak Condorcet
winner) if for each candidate d, more than (at least) half of the voters prefer c to d. In the
multiwinner case, a committee is Gehrlein strongly-stable (resp. weakly-stable) if every committee
member is preferred to every non-member by more than (at least) half of the voters [14], and a
multiwinner rule is Gehrlein strongly-stable (resp. weakly-stable) if it outputs exactly the Gehrlein
strongly-stable (weakly-stable) committees whenever they exist. For example, let the NED score
of a committee S be the number of pairs (c, d) such that (i) c is a candidate in S, (ii) d is a
candidate outside of S, and (iii) at least half of the voters prefer c to d. Then, the NED rule [8],
defined to output the committees with the highest NED score, is Gehrlein weakly-stable. In
contrast, the k-Copeland0 rule is Gehrlein strongly-stable but not weakly-stable (the Copelandα
score of a candidate c, where α ∈ [0, 1], is the number of candidates d such that a majority of the
voters prefer c to d, plus α times the number of candidates e such that exactly half of the voters
prefer c to e; winning k-Copelandα committees consist of k candidates with the highest scores).
Detailed studies of Gehrlein stability mostly focused on the weak variant of the notion [2, 16].
Very recent findings, as well as results from this paper, suggest that the strong variant is more
appealing [1, 23]; for example, all Gehrlein weakly-stable rules are NP-hard to compute [1], whereas
there are strongly-stable rules (such as k-Copeland0) that are polynomial-time computable.
STV. For an election with m candidates, the STV rule executes up to m rounds as follows. In a
single round, it checks whether there is a candidate c who is ranked first by at least q = b nk+1c+ 1
voters and, if so, then it (i) includes c into the winning committee, (ii) removes exactly q voters
that rank c first from the election, and (iii) removes c from the remaining preference orders. If such
a candidate does not exist, then a candidate d that is ranked first by the fewest voters is removed.
Note that this description does not specify which q voters to remove or which candidate to remove
if there is more than one that is ranked first by the fewest voters. We adopt the parallel-universes
tie-breaking model and we say that a committee wins under STV if there is any way of breaking
such internal ties that leads to him or her being elected [9].
We can compute some STV winning committee by breaking the internal ties in some arbitrary
way, but it is NP-hard to decide if a given committee wins [9].
Parametrized Complexity. We assume familiarity with basic notions of parametrized com-
plexity, such as parametrized problems, FPT-algorithms, and W [1]-hardness. For details, we refer
to the textbook of Cygan et al. [10].
In a couple of proofs in the paper we use the concept of the dissatisfaction of the voters from
a committee according to the β-CC rule. The dissatisfaction of a voter v from a committee S is
equal to (m− 1) minus the Borda score of the most preferred member of S (according to v). Thus,
if S contains v’s top preferred candidate, then the dissatisfaction of v from S is equal to zero.
If S contains v’s second most preferred candidate, then such dissatisfaction is equal to one, etc.
The total dissatisfaction of the voters from S is defined as the sum of the dissatisfactions over all
individual voters.
3 Robustness Levels of Multiwinner Rules
In this section we identify the robustness levels of our multiwinner rules. We start by defining
this notion formally; note that the definition below has to take into account that a voting rule can
output several tied committees.
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Definition 1. The robustness level of a multiwinner rule R for elections with m candidates and
committee size k is the smallest value ` such that for each election E = (C, V ) with |C| = m, each
election E′ obtained from E by making a single swap of adjacent candidates in a single vote, and
each committee W ∈ R(E, k), there exists a committee W ′ ∈ R(E′, k) such that |W ∩W ′| ≥ k− `.
All rules that we consider belong to one of two extremes: Either they are 1-robust (i.e., they
are very robust) or they are k-robust (i.e., they are possibly very non-robust). We start with a
large class of rules that are 1-robust.
Proposition 1. Let R be a voting rule that assigns points to candidates and selects those with the
highest scores. If a single swap in an election affects the scores of at most two candidates (decreases
the score of one and increases the score of the other), then the robustness level of R is equal to one.
Proof. Let E be an election, k be a committee size, and W be committee in R(E, k). We write
s(c) to denote the individual R-score of a candidate c in E. We rename the candidates so that (i)
s(c1) ≥ . . . ≥ s(cm) and (ii) W = {c1, . . . , ck}. Now consider an election E′ obtained from E with
a single swap. This swap can increase the score of at most one candidate, say ci, while decreasing
the score of at most one other candidate, say cj . There are several cases to consider:
1. If i ≤ k and j > k, then W is still winning in E′.
2. If i ≤ k and j ≤ k, then either W or {c1, . . . , ck+1} \ {cj} is winning in E′.
3. If i > k and j > k, then either W or {c1, . . . , ck−1} ∪ {ci} is winning in E′.
4. If i > k and j ≤ k, then either W or {c1, . . . , ck−1} ∪ {ci} or {c1, . . . , ck+1} \ {cj} or
{c1, . . . , ck+1} \ {cj} ∪ {ci} is winning in E′.
In each case, there is a committee W ′ ∈ R(E′, k) such that |W ∩W ′| ≥ k − 1.
Proposition 1 This suffices to deal with four of our rules.
Corollary 1. SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, and k-Copelandα (for each α) are 1-robust.
In contrast, Gehrlein weakly-stable rules are k-robust.
Proposition 2. The robustness level of each Gehrlein weakly-stable rule is k.
Proof. Consider the following election, described through its majority graph (in a majority graph,
each candidate is a vertex and there is a directed arc from candidate u to candidate v if more than
half of the voters prefer u to v; the classic McGarvey’s theorem says that each majority graph
can be implemented with polynomially many votes [21]). We form an election with candidate set
C = A ∪ B ∪ {c}, where A = {a1, . . . , ak} and B = {b1, . . . , bk}, and with the following majority
graph: The candidates in A form one cycle, the candidates in B form another cycle, and there are
no other arcs (i.e., for all other pairs of candidates (x, y) the same number of voters prefers x to
y as the other way round). We further assume that there is a vote, call it v, where c is ranked
directly below a1 (McGarvey’s theorem easily accommodates this need).
In the constructed election, there are two Gehrlein weakly-stable committees, A and B. To
see this, note that if a Gehrlein weakly-stable contains some ai then it must also contain all other
members of A (otherwise there would be a candidate outside of the committee that is preferred by
a majority of the voters to a committee member). An analogous argument holds for B.
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If we push c ahead of a1 in vote v, then a majority of the voters prefers c to a1. Thus, A is
no longer Gehrlein weakly-stable and B becomes the unique winning committee. Since (1) A and
B are disjoint, (2) A is among the winning committees prior to the swap, and (3) B is the unique
winning committee after the swap; we have that every Gehrlein weakly-stable rule is k-robust.
To complete this section we show that the robustness levels of β-CC and STV are k. Such
negative results seem unavoidable among rules that—like β-CC and STV—provide diversity or
proportionality (we discuss this further in Section 4).
Proposition 3. The robustness level of β-CC is k.
Proof. We construct the following election with the candidate set C := A∪B ∪{x, y}, |A| = k− 1,
|B| = k − 1. We construct one vote as follows:
v1 : x  y  A  B,
and for each i ∈ [k − 1] we construct two votes as follows:
v2i : ai  x  A \ {ai}  B  y,
v2i+1 : bi  y  A  B \ {bi}  x.
Observe that the only winning committee is {x} ∪ B. To see this, notice that {x} ∪ B has
dissatisfaction of only k − 1 (the concept of dissatisfaction is introduced at the beginning of the
appendix). Further, every voter has a different favorite candidate, there are 2k − 1 voters but the
committee size is only k. Hence, every at least equally good committee must contain k of the
“favorite” candidates from {x} ∪ A ∪ B and every voter that is not represented by her favorite
candidate must be represented by her second choice. Now, without candidate x being in the
committee, voter v1 cannot be represented by its second choice because y /∈ {x} ∪ A ∪ B. So,
x is indeed in the committee and so the remaining committee members are from B since only the
voters v2i, i ∈ [k − 1], can be represented by their second choices.
If we swap x and y in the first vote, then, following analogous argumentation, the unique
winning committee becomes {y} ∪ A. Finally, we mention that the construction above works for
any committee size.
Proposition 4. The robustness level of STV is k.
Proof. Let us fix a committee size k and consider the set of m = 2k candidates C := A ∪ B,
where A = {a1, . . . , ak} and B = {b1, . . . , bk}. We construct the following profile. We start by
taking the votes representing each of the (2k)! possible rankings over S, and remove these votes
which rank a1 or b1 first. Next, for each b ∈ B we add (2k−1)!k voters who rank a1 first, b second,
next all other candidates from B ranked in some fixed arbitrary order, followed by the remaining
candidates from A. Similarly, for each a ∈ A we add (2k−1)!k voters who rank b1 first, a second, next
all other candidates from A, and finally, the remaining candidates from B; additionally, in one of
these votes, call it the pivotal vote, we swap b1 and a (a is chosen arbitrarily).
In the profile described above, STV eliminates b1 first. After b1 is removed, each candidate
from A will be ranked top by (significantly) more voters than each candidate from B. As a result,
in each of the next k steps candidates from B will be eliminated. Thus, A is the unique winner in
this profile. Now, let us analyze what happens when we swap b1 and a in the pivotal vote. STV
might eliminate a1 first. By the same reasoning as before, we infer that B is a possible winner in
such adjacent profile. The claim now follows since A ∩B = ∅.
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One may wonder whether there exist any voting rules with robustness level between 1 and k.
Although we could not identify any classical rules with this property, we found natural hybrid
multi-stage rules which satisfy it. For example, the rule which first elects half of the committee as
k-Borda does and then the other half as β-CC does has robustness level of roughly k/2.
Proposition 5. For each `, there is an `-robust rule.
Proof. We consider the following voting rule called (k − `)-Borda-`-CC which first selects k −
` committee members exactly as (k− `)-Borda would do, and then selects further ` candidates that
maximize the β-CC score of the whole committee.
As for the upper bound ` + 1, observe that we can reuse the arguments from the proof of
Proposition 1. To this end, let E be an election and let E′ be an election obtained from E by a
single swap of adjacent candidates. Let W be a winning committee in E. Following the proof of
Proposition 1 there is some W ′ being a winning committee in E′ with |W ′ ∩W | ≥ k − `− 1 (even
if all additional ` members selected during the respective CC-phases are pairwise disjoint).
For the lower bound, consider the following election which is an extension of the election used
in Proposition 3. We construct an election with the candidate set C := A∪B ∪{x, y}∪D, |A| = `,
|B| = `, |D| = k − `− 1. We construct one vote as follows:
v1 : x  y  A  B  D,
for each i ∈ [`] we construct two votes as follows:
v2i : ai  x  y  A \ {ai}  B  D,
v2i+1 : bi  y  x  A  B \ {bi}  D,
and for each j ∈ [k − `− 1] we construct `2 copies of the following two votes:
wj : dj  D \ {dj}  x  y  B  A,
w′j : dj  D \ {dj}  y  x  A  B,
Clearly, in the first phase all k − ` − 1 candidates from D will be selected which ensures that all
wj voters are perfectly satisfied. Furthermore, candidate x will be selected as candidate with the
k − `th highest Borda score. Hence, one can verify that, similarly as normal β-CC does on the
election used in the proof of Proposition 3, our rule selects all candidates from B as the remaining
` committee members. Furthermore, by swapping candidate x and candidate y in the first vote v1,
candidate y will be selected instead of candidate x as candidate with the k − `th highest Borda
score in the first phase and all candidates from A will be selected as the remaining ` committee
members in the second phase. Summarizing, the unique winning committee for this election is
D ∪ {x} ∪ B. If we, however, swap x and y in the first vote, then, the unique winning committee
becomes D ∪ {y} ∪A.
4 Computing Refinements of Robust Rules
It turns out that the dichotomy between 1-robust and k-robust rules is strongly connected to the
one between polynomial-time computable rules and those that are NP-hard. To make this claim
formal, we need the following definition.
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Definition 2. A multiwinner rule R is scoring-efficient if the following holds:
1. For each three positive integers n,m, and k (k ≤ m) there is a polynomial-time computable
election E with n voters and m candidates, such that at least one member of R(E, k) can be
computed in polynomial time.
2. There is a polynomial-time computable function fR that for each election E, committee size
k, and committee S, associates score fR(E, k, S) with S, so that R(E, k) consists exactly of
the committees with the highest fR-score.
The first condition from Definition 2 is satisfied, e.g., by weakly unanimous rules.
Definition 3 (Elkind et al. [11]). A rule R is weakly unanimous if for each election E = (C, V )
and each committee size k, if each voter ranks the same set W of k candidates on top (possibly in
different order), then W ∈ R(E, k).
All voting rules which we consider in this paper are weakly unanimous (indeed, voting rules
which are not weakly unanimous are somewhat “suspicious”). Further, all our rules, except STV,
satisfy the second condition from Definition 2. For example, while winner determination for β-CC
is indeed NP-hard, computing the score of a given committee can be done in polynomial time. We
are ready to state and prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 6. Let R be a 1-robust scoring-efficient multiwinner rule. Then there is a polynomial-
time computable rule R′ such that for each election E and committee size k we have R′(E, k) ⊆
R(E, k).
Proof. Our proof proceeds by showing a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an election E and
committee size k, finds a single committee W such that W ∈ R(E, k); we define R′(E, k) to output
{W}.
Let E = (C, V ) be our input election and let k be the size of the desired committee. Let
E′ = (C, V ′) be an election with |V ′| = |V |, whose existence is guaranteed by the first condition
of Definition 2, and let S′ be a size-k R-winning committee for this election, also guaranteed by
Definition 2.
Let E0, E1 . . . , Et be a sequence of elections such that E0 = E
′, Et = E, and for each integer
i ∈ [t], we obtain Ei from Ei−1 by (i) finding a voter v and two candidates c and d such that in
Ei−1 voter v ranks c right ahead of d, but in E voter v ranks d ahead of c (although not necessarily
right ahead of c), and (ii) swapping c and d in v’s preference order. We note that at most |C||V |2
swaps suffice to transform E′ into E (i.e., t ≤ |C||V |2).
For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}, we find a committee Si ∈ R(Ei, k). We start with S0 = S′ (which
satisfies our condition) and for each i ∈ [t], we obtain Si from Si−1 as follows: Since R is 1-robust,
we know that at least one committee S′′ from the set {S′′ | |Si−1 ∩ S′′| ≥ k − 1} is winning in Ei.
We try each committee S′′ from this set (there are polynomially many such committees) and we
compute the fR-score of each of them (recall Condition 2 of Definition 2). The committee with
the highest fR-score must be winning in Ei and we set Si to be this committee (by Definition 2,
computing the fR-scores is a polynomial-time task).
Finally, we output St. By our arguments, we have that St ∈ R(E, k). Clearly, our procedure
runs in polynomial time.
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Theorem 6 generalizes to the case of r-robust rules for constant r: Our algorithm simply has
to try more (but still polynomially many) committees S′′.
Let us note how Theorem 6 relates to single-winner rules (that can be seen as multiwinner rules
for k = 1). All such rules are 1-robust, but for those with NP-hard winner determination, even
computing the candidates’ scores is NP-hard (see, e.g., the survey of Caragiannis et al. [5]), so
Theorem 6 does not apply.
5 Complexity of Computing the Robustness Radius
In the Robustness Radius problem we ask if it is possible to change the election result by per-
forming a given number of swaps of adjacent candidates. Intuitively, the more swaps are necessary,
the more robust a particular election is.
Definition 4. Let R be a multiwinner rule. In the R Robustness Radius problem we are given
an election E = (C, V ), a committee size k, and an integer B. We ask if it is possible to obtain
an election E′ by making at most B swaps of adjacent candidates within the rankings in E so that
R(E′, k) 6= R(E, k).
This problem is strongly connected to some other problems studied in the literature. Specifically,
in the Destructive Swap Bribery problem [12, 24, 15] (DSB for short) we ask if it is possible
to preclude a particular candidate from winning by making a given number of swaps. DSB was
already used to study robustness of single-winner election rules by Shiryaev et al. [24]. We decided
to give our problem a different name, and not to refer to it as a multiwinner variant of DSB,
because we feel that in the latter the goal should be to preclude a given candidate from being a
member of any of the winning committees, instead of changing the outcome in any arbitrary way.
In this sense, our problem is very similar to the Margin of Victory problem [19, 6, 25, 4], which
has the same goal, but instead of counting single swaps, counts how many votes are changed.
We find that Robustness Radius tends to be computationally challenging. Indeed, we find
polynomial-time algorithms only for the following simple rules.
Proposition 7. SNTV Robustness Radius is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. Without loss of generality, the winning committee in the given election E is a1, . . . , ak. We
begin by guessing which candidate which is not a committee member in E will become a committee
member in E′ (where E′ is the modified election, after performing at most B swaps of consecutive
candidates); let us denote this candidate by p. Next we guess the Plurality score of p in E′; let us
denote this score by sE′(p).
There are two cases to consider now depending on whether the score of one of the current
committee members a1, . . . , ak is at most sE′(p) or not. If this is the case, then we proceed as
follows. Intuitively, we do not need to decrease the score of any current committee member, thus
we can concentrate on increasing the score of p. To this end, we can proceed greedily, where in
each greedy iteration we identify a voter which ranks p in the highest position among all voters in
the election, but not in the top position, and swapping p towards the top position in this voter. If
after B iterations p becomes a committee member, then we accept; otherwise, we reject.
The second case we shall consider is when the current score (that is, in E) of all the current
committee members a1, . . . , ak is higher than sE′(p). If this is the case, then we proceed as follows.
First we guess a committee member, say ai, whose score we will try to decrease. The point now is
that our swaps shall increase the score of p while decreasing the score of ai. To this end, we first
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guess the number x of voters which currently (that is, in E) rank ai on top and will rank p on top
in E′. Then, we identify x such voters which currently rank ai on top and, among these, rank ai
the highest; we swap ai to the top in all of these votes. Similarly, we guess the number y of votes
which currently (that is, in E) do not rank ai nor p on top and will rank p on top in E
′. Then,
we identify y such voters which currently do not rank ai nor p on top and, among these, rank ai
the highest; we swap ai to the top in all of these votes. Finally, we guess the number z of voters
which rank ai on top and will rank neither ai nor p on top in E
′. Then, we identify z such voters
and swap ai in those votes. If we have the budget to perform all the swaps described above and as
a result p enters a winning committee, then we accept; otherwise, we reject.
Proposition 8. Bloc Robustness Radius is polynomial-time solvable.
Proof. The proof resembles the proof of the Proposition 7. The main observation is that it is
sufficient to guess the candidate p which is to become a committee member, and possibly also the
committee member ai which is to cease being a committee member. Then, the task remains to
increase the score of ai while increasing the score of p. To this end, we consider the following input
types of voters in E:
(1) Voters which give a point neither to p nor to ai.
(2) Voters which do not give a point to p but give a point to ai.
(3) Voters which give a point to p but not to ai.
(4) Voters which give a point to both p and ai.
Then, we guess how voters of these input types will change in the resulting election E′, namely:
1. We guess the number of voters of input type (1) which will give a point to p in E′.
2. We guess the number of voters of input type (2) which will (a) give a point to both p and ai
in E′; (b) give a point to p but not to ai in E′; (c) will give a point neither to p nor to ai in
E′.
3. We do not consider voters of input type (3).
4. We guess the number of voters of input type (4) which will not give a point to ai in E
′ but
will continue giving a point to p.
After this guessing, we consider each of these types separately and greedily swap p up and ai
down to realize the guessing in the cheapest way possible. If we have the budget to do so and as a
result p enters a winning committee, then we accept; otherwise, we reject.
Proposition 9. k-Borda Robustness Radius is in P.
Proof. We follow similar lines as the proofs for SNTV (Proposition 7) and for Bloc (Proposition 8).
Specifically, we guess the candidate p which is to become a committee member, and possibly also
the committee member ai which is to cease being a committee member. Then, the task remains to
increase the score of ai while increasing the score of p. Now we can guess the number of voters for
which we will have a swap between ai and p, and swap them first greedily (by starting from those
for which it is the cheapest to do so); then, we guess the amount by which the score of ai needs
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to decrease and greedily realize it, and similarly guess the amount by which the score of p needs
to increase and greedily realize it too. If we have the budget to make it happen and as a result p
enters a winning committee, then we accept; otherwise, we reject.
The rules in Propositions 7, 8, 9, are all 1-robust, but not all 1-robust rules have efficient
Robustness Radius algorithms. In particular, a simple modification of a proof of Kaczmarczyk
and Faliszewski [15, Theorem 3] shows that for k-Copelandα rules (which are 1-robust) we obtain
NP-hardness. We also obtain a general NP-hardness for all Gehrlein weakly-stable rules.
Corollary 2. k-Copeland Robustness Radius is NP-hard.
Theorem 10. Robustness Radius is NP-hard for each Gehrlein weakly-stable rule.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard Set Cover problem, which, given sets S1, . . . , Sm over ele-
ments x1, . . . , xn, asks for h sets which, together, cover all elements. We create an election with
the set of candidates A ∪B ∪X ∪D, where:
• A = {a1, . . . , ak},
• B = {b1, . . . , bk},
• X = {x1, . . . , xn},
• D = {d1, . . . , dn2}.
We state the electorate in terms of the majority graph, where:
• we make A to be a cycle by adding an arc (ai, ai+1} for each i ∈ [k − 1] as well as the arc
(ak, a1),
• we make B to be a cycle by adding an arc (bi, bi+1} for each i ∈ [k − 1] as well as the arc
(bk, b1),
• we make X to be a cycle by adding an arc (xi, xi+1} for each i ∈ [n − 1] as well as the arc
(xn, x1),
• we make D to be a cycle by adding an arc (di, di+1} for each i ∈ [n2 − 1] as well as the arc
(dn2 , d1),
• we let each xi (i ∈ [n]) win over a1 specifically by adding, for each set Sj = {xj′ , xj′′ , xj′′′},
one voter Sj with the preference order Sj : xj′  xj′′  xj′′′  D  a1  . . ..
We set the budget to be h · (|D|+3) (we need to swap a1 to the front of h voters, corresponding
to a set cover, and in each such voter, if we reduce from X3C, then we need to swap it |D| + 3
times).
As a result, we have that B is the only Gehrlein weakly-stable committee, thus any Gehrlein
weakly-stable rule shall select it. Initially, A is not a Gehrlein weakly-stable rule, but by choosing
a set cover and swapping a1 to the first position in the corresponding voters, it becomes a Gehrlein
weakly-stable committee.
Without much surprise, we find that Robustness Radius is also NP-hard for STV and for
β-CC. For these rules, however, the hardness results are, in fact, significantly stronger. In both
cases it is NP-hard to decide if the election outcome changes after a single swap, and for STV
the result holds even for committees of size one (β-CC with committees of size one is simply the
single-winner Borda rule, for which the problem is polynomial-time solvable [24]).
11
Theorem 11. β-CC Robustness Radius is NP-hard and W[1]-hard with respect to the size of
the committee even if the robustness radius is one.
Proof. We reduce from the Regular Multicolored Independent Set problem which asks,
given an undirected graph G where each vertex has one of h colors and exactly d neighbors, whether
there is an h-colored independent set that is, a size-h set of pairwise non-adjacent vertices containing
one vertex from each color class. This problem is W[1]-hard for the parameter h [10][Corollary 13.8].
In order to show that β-CC Robustness Radius is W[1]-hard we will provide a parameterized
reduction with respect to the parameters h, and the committee size k (for the definition of the
parameterized reductions we refer the reader to the book of Cygan et al. [10]).
Given an instance (G, h, d) of Regular Multicolored Independent Set we construct a
β-CC Robustness Radius instance as follows. To this end, let s := |V (G)| and r := |E(G)|.
Candidates, committee size, and construction idea. The set of candidates consists
of the vertex set V (G) of the graph G, the set Z := {z0, z1, z2} of special candidates, the set
X := {x1, . . . , xh} of safe candidates, and the set D of dummy candidates (its size is polynomial in
s+ r and will become clear later). We set the committee size k := h+ 2.
The idea is as follows. The election will have at least the safe committee {z0, z1, x1, . . . , xh}
as (possibly unique) winning committee. If there is an h-colored independent set, then also every
committee {z0, z2}∪V ′ with V ′ ⊆ V (G) being an h-colored independent set wins and one can easily
reduce the set of winning committees by a single swap. However, if there is no h-colored independent
set, then the safe winning committee {z0, z1, x1, . . . , xh} is unique and the total dissatisfaction
(recall that we define the concept of dissatisfaction at the beginning of the appendix) of the next
best committee differs by at least four (thus, a single swap cannot change the set of winning
committees).
Dummy candidates. In this construction, we will introduce a lot of dummy candidates which
simplify the construction and the respective proof significantly. The idea behind is as follows:
Our construction ensures that the total dissatisfaction of all voters given some optimal winning
committee is upper-bounded by ∆ := 8r+h · s2. Now in our construction, every dummy candidate
appears at most in one vote at some of the first ∆ positions and in all other voter in later positions.
This ensures that a dummy candidate can never be part of a winning committee. To further simplify
the writeup we use the symbol “≫ ” to denote a block of ∆ many consecutive dummy candidates.
It is easy to verify that there is no need to specify the concrete ordering of the candidates behind
such a block of ∆ many dummy candidates.
Voter groups. In the following, we describe the voters of our election in four groups, each
playing a specific role in the construction. We briefly mention the respective roles and formally
prove them later.
Special candidates group. This group consists of h+ 3 copies of the vote “z0 ≫  . . . ” and
ensures that one must include candidate z0 in the committee.
Safe committee group. For each color i ∈ [h] we add (s − 1) · s/2 + 6d copies of the vote
“xi  z2  ≫  . . . ”. This group is essential to ensure that the safe winning commit-
tee {z0, z1, x1, . . . , xh} is indeed among the winning committees.
Vertex selection group. For each color i ∈ [h] we add the following s votes where each vertex
appears exactly once in each of the first s positions. Technically, we start with the following
votes
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v1  v2  . . .  vs−1  vs  z1  ≫  . . .
v2  v3  . . .  vs  v1  z1  ≫  . . .
...
...
...
vs  v1  . . .  vs−2  vs−1  z1  ≫  . . .
and replace each vertex that is not of color i by a new dummy candidate. The intuition
behind this group is to ensure that every further winning committee (not being the safe
winning committee) must select exactly one vertex of each color.
Independent set detector group. For every edge {u, v} we introduce two pairs of votes as fol-
lows:
u  v  z0 ≫  . . .
v  u  z0 ≫  . . .
The intuition of this group is to ensure that one cannot put two adjacent vertices into a
winning committee.
This completes the construction which can be performed in polynomial time.
Possible committees. Before we formally prove the correctness of our construction, we
discuss several important facts about possible winning committees for the constructed election.
First, observe that the safe committee {z0, z1, x1, . . . , xh} causes total dissatisfaction ∆: There
is no dissatisfaction from the special candidates group and from the safe committee group, there are
8r dissatisfaction points from the independent set detector group and h · s2 dissatisfaction points
from the vertex selection group.
Second, observe that also every committee {z0, z2} ∪ V ′ with V ′ ⊆ V (G) being an h-colored in-
dependent set causes total dissatisfaction ∆: There is no dissatisfaction from the special candidates
group, h((s− 1) · s/2 + 6d) dissatisfaction points from the safe committee group, h(s+ 1) · s/2 dis-
satisfaction points from the vertex selector group, and 8r − h6d dissatisfaction points from the
independent set detector group. These numbers are obvious for the former two groups, so let
us focus on the latter two groups. As for the safe committee group, note that any committee
that contains exactly one vertex of each color causes h(s+ 1) · s/2 dissatisfaction points from this
group: For every color i ∈ [h], the corresponding committee member appears exactly once in every
position `, 1 ≤ ` ≤ s for some of of the s voters corresponding to color i. There is one voter with dis-
satisfaction 0 (where the committee member is at the top position), one voter with dissatisfaction 0
(where the committee member is at the second position), and so on. Thus the total dissatisfaction
is 0 + 1 + · · ·+ s− 1 = (s− 1) · s/2. As for the independent set detector group, let us distinguish
between (1) edges {v, u} which are not covered by the committee, that is, neither u nor v are part
of the committee, (2) edges {v, u} which are covered once by the committee, that is, either u or v is
part of the committee, and (3) edges {v, u} which are covered twice by the committee, that is, both
u and v are part of the committee. Observe that the committee causes 8 dissatisfaction points for
every four voters corresponding to an uncovered edge, 8−6 = 2 dissatisfaction points for every four
voters corresponding to an edge that is covered once, and no dissatisfaction points for every four
voters corresponding to an edge that is covered twice. Now, since V ′ corresponds to an independent
set of size h and every vertex has d neighbors, it holds that there are 8r−h6d dissatisfaction points
from the independent set detector group.
Next, we show that any other committee causes total dissatisfaction at least ∆+4. To this end,
we distinguish between five cases for possible committees and call a committee that causes total
dissatisfaction at most ∆ + 2 almost winning.
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Every committee C ′ + {z0} causes total dissatisfaction at least ∆+h. When z0 is not part of the
committee, then up to k = h + 2 voters from the special candidates group receive dissatisfaction
at least one (in best case, they are represented by their second-best choice) while the h + 3rd
voter receives dissatisfaction at least ∆. Summarizing, z0 must be part of every (almost-)winning
committee.
Every committee C ′ ⊇ {z0, z1, z2} causes total dissatisfaction at least ∆ + (s − 1) · s/2 + 6d.
Consider the dissatisfaction of the voters when they would only be represented by {z0, z1, z2}. So
far, there is no dissatisfaction from the special candidates group, h((s−1) ·s/2+6d) dissatisfaction
points from the safe committee group, hs2 dissatisfaction points from the vertex selector group,
and 8r dissatisfaction points from the independent set detector group. Hence, the remaining h −
1 candidates must further reduce the total dissatisfaction by h((s − 1) · s/2 + 6d). However, no
single candidate can reduce the total dissatisfaction by more than (s−1) · s/2 + 6d. This is obvious
for safe candidates. For vertex candidates, observe that the dissatisfaction in the vertex selection
group will be reduced by at most (s− 1) · s/2—and only if the committee does not already contain
a vertex of the same color—while the dissatisfaction in the independent set detector group will
be reduced by at most 6d—and only if none of the d neighbors is already part of the committee.
Summarizing, an (almost-) winning committee cannot contain both, candidate z1 and candidate z2.
Every committee C ′ + {z2} that does not contain all candidates from {x1, . . . , xh} causes total
dissatisfaction (much) larger than 2∆. Without loss of generality assume that C ′ + {z2, xi}. Then
at least (s−1) ·s/2+6d− (h+1) > 2 copies of the vote “xi  z2 ≫  . . . ” are dissatisfied by at
least ∆. Every committee C ′ + {z1} that does not contain one vertex vi of each color i causes total
dissatisfaction (much) larger than 2∆. Without loss of generality assume that C ′ does not contain
a vertex of color i. Then, s − (h + 1) > 1 of the votes corresponding to color i are dissatisfied by
at least ∆. By very similar arguments one can show that every committee C ′ + {z1, z2} causes
total dissatisfaction (much) larger than 2∆. Summarizing, an (almost-)winning committee that is
not the safe committee {z0, z1, x1, . . . , xh} must be of the form {z0, z2}∪V ′ with V ′ containing one
vertex of each color i.
Finally, every committee {z0, z2} ∪ V ′ with V ′ ⊆ V (G) not being an h-colored independent set
causes total dissatisfaction at least ∆ + 4. There is no dissatisfaction from the special candidates
group, h((s−1) ·s/2+6d) dissatisfaction points from the safe committee group, h(s+1) ·s/2 dissat-
isfaction points from the vertex selector group, and at least 8r−h6d+ 4 dissatisfaction points from
the independent set detector group. For the latter group, let q be the number of edges between
vertices from V ′. Thus, there are q edges that are covered twice, hd − 2q edges that are covered
once, and all remaining edges are uncovered. The total dissatisfaction of the corresponding voters
is at least 8r− 6(hd− 2q)− 8q = 8r− 6hd− 4q. Since V ′ is not an independent set, we have q ≥ 1
and the claim follows.
Correctness. The correctness easily follows from the above discussion: On the one hand,
if graph G does not contain an h-colored independent set, then the safe committee is the only
winning committee with total dissatisfaction ∆ and every other committee has dissatisfaction at
least ∆ + 4. Thus, a single swap cannot change the set of winning committees. On the other hand,
if graph G does contain an h-colored independent set, then the safe committee is a non-unique
winning committee. It is easy to verify that the safe committee does not win anymore if one swaps
candidate z2 with some candidate xi in some vote from the safe committee group.
Theorem 12. STV Robustness Radius is NP-hard even for k = 1 and B = 1.
Proof. We give a reduction from STV Winner Determination—the problem of deciding whether
for a given election, a given candidate can become an STV winner. This problem is known to be
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NP-hard [9][Theorem 4] for k = 1. Let I be an instance of the STV Winner Determination
problem. In I we are given an election E = (V,C), |V | = n, and a distinguished candidate c ∈ C;
we ask if there exists a valid run of STV such that c becomes a winner in E. W.l.o.g., we can
assume that c is ranked first by some voter.
From I we construct an instance I ′ of the STV Robustness Radius problem as follows. We
fix the new set of candidates to C ′ = C ∪ {d}; here, d is a dummy candidate needed by our
construction. For each v ∈ V , we put d in v’s preference ranking right behind c, and add two copies
of such modified vote to I ′, we call such votes non-dummy. Additionally, we add 2n + 1 dummy
voters who rank d first, c second and all the remaining candidates next (i some fixed arbitrary
order). It is easy to check that d is the unique winner in such instance. Next, observe that if we
want to change the outcome of an election with a single swap, then we definitely need to swap c
and d for one of the voters who rank d first. Let us consider such modified election, call it E′′.
Observe that if c is a possible winner in I, then c is also a possible winner in E′′. Indeed, STV
can first eliminate all candidates except for c and d. In such truncated profile, there will be 2n+ 1
voters who prefer c to d and 2n voters who prefer d to c; hence c will become a winner.
If c is not a possible winner in I, then c will be eliminated before any other candidate from
C ∪{d} in E′′. Indeed, in each sequence of eliminations performed by STV, there will be a moment
when there are still some remaining candidates in C \ {c} and that each such candidate is ranked
first by at least 2 more non-dummy voters than c; as a result each such candidate will be ranked
first by more (dummy and non-dummy) voters than c. In particular, c will be removed from the
election before some candidate from C \ {c}, and so, also before d. After c is removed from E′′,
there will be at least 2n + 1 voters who rank d first, thus this candidate will become the unique
winner. Consequently, we have shown that an outcome of an election can change with a single
swap if and only if the answer to the original instance I is “yes”. This completes the proof.
For the case of β-CC, the proof of Theorem 11 gives much more than stated in the theorem.
Indeed, our construction shows that the problem remains NP-hard even if we are given a current
winning committee as part of the input. Further, the same construction gives the following corollary
(whose first part is sometimes taken for granted in the literature, but has not been shown formally
yet).
Corollary 3. The problem of deciding if a given candidate belongs to some β-CC winning committee
(for a given election and committee size) is both NP-hard and coNP-hard.
We conclude this section by providing FPT algorithms for Robustness Radius. An FPT
algorithm for a given parameter (e.g., the number of candidates or the number of voters) must
have running time of the form f(k)|I|O(1), where k is the value of the parameter and |I| is the
length of the encoding of the input instance. Using the standard approach of formulating integer
linear programs and invoking the algorithm of Lenstra [17], we find that Robustness Radius is
in FPT when parametrized by the number of candidates.
Proposition 13. Robustness Radius for k-Copeland, NED, STV, and β-CC is in FPT
(parametrized by the number of candidates).
For STV and β-CC we also get algorithms parametrized by the number of voters. For the case
of STV, we assume that the value of k is such that we never need to “delete non-existent voters”
and we refer to committee sizes where such deleting is not necessary as normal. For example, a
committee size k is not normal if k > n (where n is the number of voters). Another example is to
take n = 12 and k = 5: We need to delete q = b 125+1c + 1 = 3 voters for each committee member,
which requires deleting 15 voters out of 12.
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Theorem 14. STV Robustness Radius is in FPT when parametrized by the number n of voters
(for normal committee sizes).
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be our input election and let k be the size of the desired committee. For
each candidate c, “rank of c” is defined as rank(c) = minv∈V (posv(c)).
First, we prove that a candidate with a rank higher than n cannot be a member of a winning
committee. Let us assume towards a contradiction that there exists a candidate c with rank(c) >
n who is a member of some winning committee W . When STV adds some candidate to the
committee (this happens when the number of voters who rank such a candidate first exceeds the
quota b nk+1c+ 1), it removes this candidate and at least one voter from the election. Thus, before c
were included in W , STV must have removed some candidate c′ from the election without adding
it to W (this is so because c had to be ranked first by some voter to be included in the committee;
for c to be ranked first, STV had to delete at least n candidates, so by the assumption that the
committee size is normal, not all of them could have been included in the committee). Since STV
always removes a candidate with the lowest Plurality score, and at the moment when c′ was removed
the Plurality score of c was equal to zero, we have that the Plurality score of c′ also must have been
zero. Consequently, removing c′ from the election did not affect the top preferences of the voters,
and STV, right after removing c′, removed another candidate with zero Plurality score from the
election. By repeating this argument sufficiently many times, we conclude that c must have been
eventually eliminated, and so could not have been added to W . This gives a contradiction and
proves our claim.
The same reasoning also shows that the number of committees winning according to STV
is bounded by a function of n: In each step either one of at most n voters is removed, or all
candidates who are not ranked first by any voter are removed from the election (which leaves at
most n candidates in the election).
Second, we observe that the robustness radius for our election is at most n2. Indeed, we can
take any winning candidate, and with at most n2 swaps we can push him or her to have rank at
least n+ 1. Such a candidate will no longer be a member of W and, so, the outcome of the election
will change.
Third, we observe that in order to change the outcome of an election, we should only swap such
candidates that at least one of them has rank at most n2 + n + 1. Indeed, consider a candidate c
with rank(c) > n2 +n+ 1. After n2 swaps, the rank of this candidate would still be above n, so he
or she still would not belong to any winning committee. Thus, a swap of any two candidates with
ranks higher than n2 + n + 1 does not belong to any of the sequences of at most n2 swaps that
change the election result (the exact positions of these two candidates would have no influence on
the STV outcome).
As a result, it suffices to focus on the candidates with ranks at most n2 + n+ 1. There are at
most n(n2 + n+ 1) such candidates. Consequently, there are at most (2n3 + 2n2 + 2n)n
2
possible
n2-long sequences of swaps which we need to check in order to find the optimal one. This completes
the proof.
The algorithm for the case of β-CC is more involved. Briefly put, it relies on finding in FPT
time (with respect to the number of voters) either the unique winning committee or two committees
tied for victory. In the former case, it combines brute-force search with dynamic programming,
and in the latter either a single swap or a clever greedy algorithm suffice. Due to clarity, we start
with presenting the first phase, i.e., finding the unique winning committee or two tied committees,
as a separate proposition.
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Proposition 15. There is an algorithm that runs in FPT time with respect to the number of voters
and, given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee size k, checks whether the election has a unique
β-CC winning committee (in which case it outputs this committee) or whether there is more than
one β-CC winning committee (in which case it outputs some two winning committees).
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be an input election and let k be the committee size. We let n = |V | be the
number of voters. If k ≥ n, then every winning committee consists of each voter’s most preferred
candidate and sufficiently many other candidates to form a committee of size exactly k. In this
case the algorithm can easily provide the required output, so we assume that k < n. (To avoid
triviality, w.l.o.g., we also assume that there are more than k candidates.)
Our algorithm proceeds by considering all partitions of V into k disjoint sets (there are at most
kn ≤ nn such partitions). For a partition V1, . . . , Vk the algorithm proceeds as follows (intuitively,
the voters in each group Vi are to be represented by the Borda winner of the election (C, Vi)):
1. For each election Ei = (C, Vi) we compute the set Bi of candidates that are Borda winners
of Ei.
2. If each Bi is a singleton and all Bi’s are distinct, then we store a single committee W =
B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bk. Otherwise, it is possible to form two distinct committees, W1 and W2, such
that for each Bi, W1 ∩Bi 6= ∅ and W2 ∩Bi 6= ∅;4 we store both W1 and W2.
We check if among the stored committees there is a unique committee W such that every other
stored committee has lower β-CC score. If such a committee exists then we output it as the unique
winning committee. Otherwise, there are two stored committees, WA and WB, that both have
β-CC score greater than or equal to that of every other stored committee. We output WA and WB
as two committees tied for winning (if there is more than one choice for WA and WB then we pick
one pair arbitrarily).
Before we move on to the proof of the next theorem, we need to introduce some additional
notation. Let E = (C, V ) be some election and let v be some voter in V . By top(v) we mean
the candidate ranked first by v. By top(E) we mean the set {top(v) | v ∈ V }, that is, the set of
candidates that are ever ranked first in election E. For a committee W , the representative of a
voter v is the member of W that v ranks highest. Finally, for committee W and voter v, we define
repposv(W ) to be the position of v’s representative from W in v’s vote.
Theorem 16. β-CC Robustness Radius is in FPT when parameterized by the number of voters.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be our input election and let k be the committee size. We let m = |C| be
the number of candidates. Using Proposition 15, we check whether there is a unique β-CC winning
committee in E. Depending on the result, we proceed in one of the following two ways.
There is a unique winning committee W . We first describe a function that encapsulates the
effect of shifting forward a particular candidate within a given set of votes. For each voter v, each
4We can form W1 and W2 as follows. First, for each Bi we include the lexicographically first member of Bi in W1
and the lexicographically last one in W2. If at least one Bi contains more than one candidate, then we will obtain
distinct committees, possibly of size smaller than k. If each Bi is a singleton, then we obtain two identical committees
that certainly contain less than k candidates (otherwise we would not enter this part of the algorithm). In either
case, since there are more than k candidates in the election, it is possible to supplement W1 and W2 with candidates
so that they are distinct and of size exactly k.
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candidate c, and each nonnegative integer b, we define shift(v, c, b) to be the vote obtained from
that of v by shifting c by b positions forward, and we define:
g(v, c, b) = βm(posshift(v,c,b)(c))− βm(repposshift(v,c,b)(W )).
In other words, g(v, c, b) is the difference between the Borda scores of c and the highest-ranked
member of W in vote v with c shifting b positions forward.
Let V ′ be some subset of voters, and let us rename the voters so that V ′ = {v1, . . . , vn′}. For
each candidate c and each nonnegative integer b, we define:
g(V ′, c, b) = max
{ n′∑
i=1
g(vi, c, b1)
∣∣∣∣ b1, . . . , bn′ ≥ 0 and b1 + · · ·+ bn′ = b}.
Intuitively, g(V ′, c, b) specifies how many points more would c receive from the voters in V ′ as their
representative than these voters would assign to their representatives from W , if we shifted c by b
positions forward in an optimal way.
We assume that g(∅, c, b) = 0 for each choice of c and b. We can compute g(V ′, c, b) in polynomial
time using dynamic programming and the following formula (for each 1 ≤ t < n′):5
g({v1, . . . , vt}, c, b) = max
0≤bt≤b
g({v1, . . . , vt−1}, c, b− bt) + g(vt, c, bt).
With the function g in hand, we are ready to describe the algorithm. We consider every partition
of V into k disjoint subsets V1, . . . , Vk; let us fix one such partition. Our goal is to compute the
smallest nonnegative integer b such that there is a sequence of nonnegative integers b1, . . . , bk that
adds up to b, and a sequence c1, . . . , ck of (not necessarily distinct) candidates so that:
(a) g(V1, c1, b1) + · · ·+ g(Vk, ck, bk) ≥ 0,
(b) there is a committee W ′ such that {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆W ′ and W ′ 6= W .
Intuitively, the role of candidates c1, . . . , ck is to be the representatives of the voters from sets
V1, . . . , Vk, respectively, in a new committee W
′, distinct from W , that either defeats W or ties
with it. More formally, condition (a) ensures that there is a way to perform b = b1 + · · ·+ bk swaps
so that the score of committee W ′ is at least as large as that of W , and condition (b) requires that
W ′ 6= W and deals with the possibility that candidates in c1, . . . , ck are not distinct.
To compute b, we will need the following function (C ′ is a subset of candidates—we will end up
using only polynomially many different ones—i is an integer in [k], and b is a nonnegative integer):
f(C ′, i, b) = max
{ i∑
j=1
g(Vi, ci, bi)
∣∣∣∣ c1, . . . , ci ∈ C ′, b1, . . . , bi ≥ 0, b1 + · · · bi = b}.
We have that the smallest value b such that f(C ′, k, b) ≥ 0 is associated with candidates c1, . . . , ck
and values b1, . . . , bk that satisfy condition (a) above, under the condition that c1, . . . ck belong
to C ′. To obtain the smallest value b that is associated with values b1, . . . , bk and c1, . . . , ck that
satisfy both conditions (a) and (b) above, it suffices to compute:
bV1,...,Vk = min{b ∈ N | w ∈W ∧ f(C − {w}, k, b) ≥ 0}
5In fact, it is possible to compute g(V ′, c, b) using a greedy algorithm, but the dynamic programming formulation
is far easier and allows us to sidestep many special cases, such as what happens if c is him or herself a member of W .
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The fact that we use sets of the form C − {w} in the invocation of function f ensures that we
obtain committees distinct from W . The fact that we try all w ∈ W guarantees that we try all
possibilities. The smallest value bV1,...,Vk over all partitions of V is the smallest number of swaps
necessary to change the outcome of the election.
It remains to show that we can compute function f in polynomial time. This follows by assuming
that f(C ′, 0, b) = 0 (for each C ′ and b) and applying dynamic programming techniques on top of
the following formula (which holds for each i ∈ [k]):
f(C ′, i, b) = max
0≤bi≤b,ci∈C′
f(C ′, i− 1, b− bi) + g(Vi, ci, bi).
The part of the proof where there is a unique winning β-CC winning committee for E is complete.
There are at least two committees that tie for victory. Let WA and WB be two β-CC
winning committees for E (the algorithm from Proposition 15 provides them readily). We check
if there is some voter v, whose representatives under WA and WB are distinct. If such a voter
exists then a single swap is sufficient to prevent one of the committees from winning: Let a be
the representative of v under WA, and let b be the representative of v under WB. Without loss
of generality, we assume that a is ranked higher than b. It suffices to shift b one position higher.
It certainly is possible (since b was ranked below a, he or she certainly is not ranked first) and
it increases the β-CC score of WB, while the score of WA either stays the same or decreases (the
score of WA would stay the same, e.g., if b were ranked just below a and b also belonged to WA;
a certainly does not belong to WB because v does not have a as a representative under WB). In
consequence, WA certainly is not a winning committee after the swap and, thus, the set of winning
committees changes.
Let us now consider the case where each voter has the same representative under both WA and
WB, and let R be the set of voters’ representatives (R ⊆WA∩WB). Since WA and WB are distinct,
there are candidates a ∈ WA \WB and b ∈ WB \WA and, in consequence, we know that |R| < k.
We claim that R = top(E), i.e., that each representative is ranked first by some voter. For the
sake of contradiction, let us assume that there is a voter v that is not represented by his or her
top-preferred candidate. In this case, committee WC obtained from WA by replacing candidate a
with candidate top(v) has higher score than WA (voter v has a higher-ranked representative and all
the other voters have the same or higher-ranked representatives), which contradicts the fact that
WA is a winning committee. Thus our claim holds.
As a consequence, the β-CC winning committees for election E are exactly those that contain
all the candidates from R. To change the election outcome, we have to transform E to an election
E′ such that top(E) 6= top(E′). We consider two types of action that achieve this effect:
1. Shift some candidate c ∈ C \ R to the top position of some voter v, thus ensuring that for
the resulting election E′ we have c ∈ top(E′) (and, by assumption, c /∈ top(E)).
2. For some two candidates c, d ∈ R and each voter v that ranks c on top, shift d to be ranked
first. This creates election E′ such that top(E′) is strictly contained in top(E).
Actions of the first type include the cheapest one that creates an election E′ such that top(E′) \
top(E) 6= ∅, and actions of the second type include the cheapest one that creates an election E′
such that top(E) \ top(E′) 6= ∅. Thus it suffices to compute the cheapest action of each type (there
are only polynomially many actions to consider) and output its cost as the smallest number of
swaps necessary to change the outcome of the election.
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It is natural to ask if the above theorem holds for other variants of the Chamberlin–Courant
rule (i.e., for the variants based on other scoring functions that the Borda one). This issue is quite
nontrivial. While the first part of the proof—where we deal with the case of a unique winning
committee—is general and works for any scoring function (indeed, it suffices to replace β, the
Borda scoring function, in the definition of function g with any other scoring rule), the case of the
second part is far less trivial.
Indeed, in the second part of the proof, when we consider the case where not all voters have
the same representative, we rely on the fact that a single swap of a representative will increase the
score of a committee. This is crucial for our argument because, due to this assumption, it does not
matter what two winning committees WA and WB we obtained from Proposition 15. Without it,
we would have to be more careful in choosing the two winning committees.
6 Beyond the Worst Case: An Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present results of experiments, in which we measure how many randomly-selected
swaps are necessary to change election results.6
We perform a series of experiments using four distributions of rankings obtained from Pre-
fLib [20], a library that contains both real-life preference data and tools for generating synthetic
elections. We use three artificial distributions (see Appendix ?? for details): (i) Impartial Culture
(IC), (ii) Mallows Model with parameter φ between 0 and 1 drawn uniformly, and (iii) the mixture
of two Mallows Models with separate parameters φ chosen identically to the previous model. Ad-
ditionally, we use one dataset describing real-life preferences over sushi sets (we treat this dataset
as a distribution, i.e., we select votes from this dataset uniformly at random).
Intuitively, in the Mallows model there is a single most probable preference order r0, and the
more swaps are necessary to modify a given order r to become r0, the less probable it is to draw
r while in the IC model, drawing each preference order is equally likely. Formally, the Mallows
model consists of a central ranking r0 of m elements and a dispersion parameter φ ∈ (0, 1] which
quantifies the concentration of the rankings around the peak r0 with respect to some distance
measure (Kendall’s tau distance in our case). The probability of a ranking r is
Pr0,φ(r) =
φd(r,r0)
Z
and Z = 1 · (1 + φ) · (1 + φ+ φ2) · · · (1 + · · ·+ φm−1),
where d is Kendall’s tau distance and Sm denotes the symmetric group of order m, that is, the
set of all rankings of m elements. Note that the normalization constant Z is actually independent
of r0. Observe that Mallows model with φ = 1 is equivalent to Impartial Culture. Mallows model
with φ→ 0 draws only the central ranking r0.
For each of these four distributions, and for each of the investigated rules (for k-Copeland we
took α = 0.5), we perform 200 simulations. In each simulation we draw an election containing
10 candidates and 50 voters from the given distribution. Then we perform swaps of adjacent
candidates: For each swap we select a pair of adjacent candidates uniformly at random. We
perform the swaps until the outcome of the election changes (we stop after 1000 swaps; taking 1000
for the computation of averages). The average number of swaps required to change the outcome
of an election for different rules and for different datasets is depicted in Figure 1. We present the
6We found STV to be computationally too intensive for our experiments, so we used a simplified variant where all
internal ties are broken lexicographically. We omit NED for similar reasons (but we expect the results to be similar
as for k-Copeland).
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Figure 1: Experimental results showing the average number of swaps needed to change the outcome
of random elections. The elections were obtained by sampling Mallows Model, the mixture of two
Mallow Models, and the Impartial Culture distributions. Elections from the sushi set were sampled
from real data concerning sushi tasting.
results for committee size k = 3; we have also performed simulations for k = 5, but they led to
analogous plots and conclusions.
Among our rules, k-Borda is the most robust one (k-Copeland holds second place), whereas
rules that achieve either diversity (β-CC and, to some extent, SNTV) or proportionality (STV)
are more vulnerable to small changes in the input. This is aligned with what we have seen in
the theoretical part of the paper (with a minor exception of SNTV). As expected, the robustness
radius decreases with the increase of randomness in the voters’ preferences. Indeed, one needs to
make more swaps to change the outcome of elections which are highly biased towards the resulting
winners. Thus we conclude that preferences in the sushi datasets are not highly centered, as the
radiuses of these elections are small.
7 Conclusions
We formalized the notion of robustness of multiwinner rules and studied the complexity of assessing
the robustness/confidence of collective multiwinner decisions. Our theoretical and experimental
analysis indicates that k-Borda is the most robust among our rules, and that proportional rules,
such as STV and the Chamberlin–Courant rule, are on the other end of the spectrum.
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